DIRECTORS ON CORPORATE BOARDS MAY
STILL RELY ON THEIR OWN RELIANCE ON
DIRECTOR AND EXPERT REPORTS
(IN MOST CASES)
Grant Thomas Williamson*
In his presentation,1 Professor Douglas K. Moll analyzes the
language that the Delaware Supreme Court chose to employ in Smith v.
Van Gorkom in holding that the directors were not entitled to defend a
claim that they breached their fiduciary duty of care on the ground that
they were relying on a report made by a corporate officer.2 Since the
directors in Smith v. Van Gorkom did not have any traditional red flags to
inform them that the report was uninformed, Professor Moll cautions that
“[t]aken literally, the court’s statement seems to suggest that directors
cannot rely upon an uninformed report—even if the directors have no
notice that the report is uninformed.”3 Professor Moll ultimately
concludes that this was not the court’s intent in Smith v. Van Gorkom, and
that the court merely sought to “reaffirm the general rule – i.e., directors
may not rely on information if they are on notice that the reliance is
unwarranted.”4
My comment will seek to further substantiate Professor Moll’s
comment as well as analyze how Tennessee courts have discussed the
reliance defense that directors have in response to claims of breach of
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Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874-75 (Del. 1985) (holding that although “[u]nder
8 Del.C. § 141 (e), ‘directors are fully protected in relying in good faith on reports made
by officers’” the directors in the case at hand did not enjoy this protection because “Van
Gorkom was basically uninformed as to the essential provisions of the very document
about which he was talking” when presenting to the board).
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fiduciary duty of care. First, Part I will analyze the language used by the
Delaware Supreme Court and seek to show that while the court may have
spoken too strongly in reaching their holding, the true intent was simply,
as Professor Moll posits, to reaffirm that directors cannot rely on reports
when their reliance is not warranted. Next, Part II will discuss Sixth Circuit
and Tennessee case law citing Smith v. Van Gorkom and how these courts
have clarified that the general rule still applies. Part III will analyze and
parse out Tennessee’s corporate statutes concerning the reliance defense.
Finally, Part IV will use Tennessee case law to illustrate whether directors
may use their reliance on reports as a defense when claims that they
breached their fiduciary duty of care are brought against them.
I.

WHY THE DELAWARE SUPREME COURT REACHED ITS
HOLDING IN SMITH V. VAN GORKOM

At first glance, the Delaware Supreme Court’s holding in Smith v.
Van Gorkom is troublesome for directors serving on corporate boards:
directors are not entitled to rely on reports that were uninformed even in
the absence of some kind of red flag that the report was uninformed.5
Taken literally, the court seems to suggest that directors may be held liable
for breaching their fiduciary duty of care when they rely on a report that
was not adequately informed even if they had no reason to suspect that
was the case. This holding would add another layer to the reliance defense6;
it would no longer be enough that the board of directors relied in good
faith on a report that they had reason to believe was adequate.7 Reading
the court’s holding in this manner would require three things of the board
of directors before they could rely on the reliance defense: 1) the director
would have to rely on the report in good faith; 2) the director would need
to reasonably believe that the report was prepared by someone whose
professional expertise encompasses the subject matter of the report and
whom was carefully selected by the corporation; and 3) the directors would
now be additionally required to perform an independent analysis of the
report to determine whether or not they believe the report’s preparer was
5

Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874–75

See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2016) (“A member of the board of directors, or a
member of any committee designated by the board of directors, shall, in the performance
of such member’s duties, be fully protected in relying in good faith upon the records of
the corporation and upon such information, opinions, reports or statements presented
to the corporation by any of the corporation’s officers or employees, or committees of
the board of directors, or by any other person as to matters the member reasonably
believes are within such other person’s professional or expert competence and who has
been selected with reasonable care by or on behalf of the corporation.”).
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adequately informed, even if there were no signs that would indicate this
possibility.8
Fortunately for corporate boards of directors moving forward, the
court’s reasoning in Van Gorkom illustrates that their holding was not
meant to transform the reliance defense, only to affirm its viability and
illustrate how it did not apply under the specific case’s factual
circumstances. The expression “bad facts lead to bad law” is often used in
the legal profession; in this case, bad facts seem to have led the Delaware
Supreme Court to overstate their holding. In reaching their conclusion,
however, the court noted that the directors had to make further inquiry
into the report presented to them because of: “all of the surrounding
circumstances -- hastily calling the meeting without prior notice of its
subject matter, the proposed sale of the Company without any prior
consideration of the issue or necessity therefor, the urgent time
constraints imposed by Pritzker, and the total absence of any
documentation whatsoever[.]”9
Because of the unique factual circumstances surrounding the
board of directors’ decision to rely on what the court deemed an
uninformed report, the Delaware Supreme Court reasoned that the board
of directors had a duty to inquire further into the nature of the report and
how its conclusions were reached.10 The court had stated prior in its
opinion that “the concept of gross negligence is also the proper standard
for determining whether a business judgment reached by a board of
directors was an informed one.”11 Taken altogether, it is evident that the
Delaware Supreme Court only intended to reaffirm the general rule that
directors are entitled to the reliance defense when, as mentioned earlier,
1) the director relied on the report in good faith and 2) the director
reasonably believed that the report was prepared by someone whose
professional expertise encompasses the subject matter of the report and
whom was carefully selected by the corporation.12 The court determined
that reliance was not warranted here, however, because of the bad facts
surrounding the presentation of the report; those facts led the court to
hold that the board of directors was not entitled to rely on the report.13 In
8
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Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 875.
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See id.
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Id. at 873.
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DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2016)

Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 875 (“At a minimum for a report to enjoy the status conferred
by [Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(e)] it must be pertinent to the subject matter upon which
13
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essence, the board of directors should have known that there might be
issues with the hastily prepared report and they were therefore grossly
negligent in not conducting further inquiry to determine whether the
report was informed or uninformed.14
The Delaware Supreme Court held that the directors breached
their fiduciary duty of care because of: the haste with which the report
was prepared; the lack of prior discussion of the transaction at issue; the
urgency that time presented in the transaction; and the lack of
documentation presented which should have served as red flags to the
board of directors that the report was not adequately informed.15 In
essence, the circumstances in Van Gorkom were such blatant indicators that
the report might be uninformed that the court felt the board of directors
were grossly negligent in relying on what was ultimately determined to be
an uninformed report and not inquiring further to determine that it was
uninformed. The court’s reasoning, however, does not suggest that all
directors must now inquire into reports to determine whether or not they
are informed and worthy of reliance; all that is required is that when red
flags appear or the circumstances under which the report is prepared are
suspect, that the directors perform some further inquiry to determine
whether or not they are warranted in relying on that report.
II.

TENNESSEE’S HANDLING OF SMITH V. VAN GORKOM

Of the Tennessee cases citing Van Gorkom that I was able to find,
none of the courts cited the case for the specific issue that this comment
addresses.
When the Sixth Circuit has had occasion to cite Van Gorkom for
cases coming to the Sixth Circuit out of Tennessee, the court has not gone
to the extreme of advocating that directors cannot rely upon uninformed
a board is called to act, and otherwise be entitled to good faith, not blind, reliance.
Considering all of the surrounding circumstances -- hastily calling the meeting without
prior notice of its subject matter, the proposed sale of the Company without any prior
consideration of the issue or necessity therefor, the urgent time constraints imposed by
Pritzker, and the total absence of any documentation whatsoever -- the directors were
duty bound to make reasonable inquiry of Van Gorkom and Romans, and if they had
done so, the inadequacy of that upon which they now claim to have relied would have
been apparent.”).
Id. at 884 (“We conclude that the Board acted in a grossly negligent manner . . . and
that Van Gorkom’s representations on which the Board based its actions do not
constitute ‘reports’ under [DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8], § 141(e) on which the directors could
reasonably have relied.”).
14

15

See id. at 875.

2019]

DIRECTORS ON CORPORTE BOARDS

737

reports even in the absence of red flags16 and has clarified that the
directors in Van Gorkom were not warranted in relying on the reports at
issue because of their “lack of knowledge and the swiftness of
deliberation.”17
III.

TENNESSEE’S CORPORATE RELIANCE STATUTES

Tennessee has two corporate statutes that outline when directors
may defend their actions because they were relying on a report prepared
by a corporate officer. The first statute, Tennennessee Code Annotated §
48-18-301, provides the standards applicable for directors on the boards
of for-profit corporations. The second statute, Tennessee Code
Annotated § 48-58-301, provides similar guidance for directors serving on
boards of nonprofit corporations.
The statutes generally require that a director must perform all his
or her duties in good faith and reasonably given the circumstances.18 The
statutes use the word “shall” in describing the requirement that directors
must perform their duties in good faith and in a reasonable manner, which
implies that this is a threshold requirement for the directors to meet in
order to be entitled to the reliance defenses outlined later in the statutes.19
The statutes20 then go on to provide what this comment has been
referring to as the reliance defense: in discharging their duties directors
may rely on reports that are prepared or presented by corporate officers,
among other specified parties.21 Subsections (b)(1) of these statutes

See McCall v. Scott, 250 F.3d 997, 999 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he Delaware Supreme Court
has specifically adopted gross negligence as the standard for measuring a director’s
liability for a breach of the duty of care.”) (citing Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872).
16

Campbell v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, Inc., 238 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858).
17

TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-301 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-58-301 (2012). Both
statutes use identical language and formatting in describing how directors must perform
their duties, whether in the nonprofit or for-profit context: “(a) A director shall discharge
all duties as a director, including duties as a member of a committee: (1) In good faith;
(2) With the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under
similar circumstances; and (3) In a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the
best interests of the corporation.”
18

19

TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-301 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-58-301 (2012).

20

Id.

Here the statutes differ slightly. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-301 (2012), which deals
with for-profit corporations states:
21
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provide the caveat that directors may rely on these reports only when the
director “reasonably believes [the report preparer] to be reliable and
competent in the matters presented.”22 Part of reasonably believing that
the report preparer is reliable is viewing the presentation in light of all the
circumstances around it, which is something the Delaware Supreme Court
did not believe the board did in Van Gorkom.23
Following this reading, gross negligence would be the standard for
determining whether a director is able to rely on a report. If, given all the
circumstances and any possible red flags, the director would be grossly
negligent not to inquire further into whether the report was informed or
uninformed, then the director cannot blindly rely on the report. If,
however, there are no red flags and the circumstances do not warrant
further inquiry, then the director would not be grossly negligent in relying
on a report even when it is later determined that the report was
uninformed.

(b) In discharging such duties, a director is entitled to rely on
information, opinions, reports, or statements, including financial
statements and other financial data, if prepared or presented by:
(1) One (1) or more officers or employees of the corporation (or a
subsidiary of the corporation) whom the director reasonably believes
to be reliable and competent in the matters presented;
(2) Legal counsel, public accountants, or other persons as to matters
the director reasonably believes are within the person’s professional or
expert competence; or
(3) A committee of the board of directors of which the director is
not a member, if the director reasonably believes the committee merits
confidence.
(c) A director is not acting in good faith if the director has knowledge
concerning the matter in question that makes reliance otherwise
permitted by subsection (b) unwarranted.
(d) A director is not liable for any action taken as a director, or any
failure to take any action, if the director performed the duties of the
office in compliance with this section.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-58-301 (2012), which deals with nonprofit corporations, adds an
additional subsection under subsection (b) that states “(4) One (1) or more volunteers of
the corporation whom the director reasonably believes to be reliable and competent in
the matters presented” and adds the following language to the end of subsection (d): “or
if the director is immune from suit under § 48-58-601.”
22

Supra note 20.

23

See generally Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).

2019]

IV.

DIRECTORS ON CORPORTE BOARDS

739

TENNESSEE CASE LAW DETAILING THE NATURE OF A
DIRECTOR’S DUTIES

Describing the business judgment rule, the Tennessee Court of
Appeals has stressed that the inquiry is into whether a board of directors
“has acted in good faith and in the exercise of honest judgment.”24
Directors can be liable when their negligence has caused injury to the
corporation and by extension to its shareholders.25 In order to truly act in
good faith while exercising honest judgment and avoiding negligence,
“directors . . . must be diligent and careful in performing their duties” and
can be “chargeable with knowledge actually possessed or which he might have
possessed had he [or she] diligently discharged his functions.”26 Therefore, if
circumstances warrant that a diligent and careful director would inquire
further into whether a report is informed or uninformed, a director will
not be able to rely on that report by foregoing any inquiry.27
Put simply, “the duty of care required of directors and officers is
‘to act in good-faith and in the best interest of the corporation with the
care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under

Lewis ex rel. Citizens Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Boyd, 838 S.W.2d 215, 220–21 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1992) (“[L]ike other courts following the business judgment rule, [Tennessee
courts] presume that a corporation’s directors, when making a business decision, acted
on an informed basis, in good faith, and with the honest belief that their decision was in
the corporation’s best interests.”).
24

See Neese v. Brown, 405 S.W.2d 577, 580 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964) (“the liability of the
directors . . . of a corporation is not limited to wilful breaches of trust or excessive power
but also extends to negligence.”).
25

Id (quoting Fletcher’s Private Corporations, Vol. 3, 1947 Rev. Ed., sec. 1029, page 54)
(emphasis added).
26

See Neese, 405 S.W.2d at 580–81(“Directors, by assuming office, agree to give as much
of their time and attention to the duties assumed as the proper care of the interests
intrusted to them may require. . . . The diligence required from them has been defined
as that exercised by prudent men about their own affairs, being that degree of diligence
characterized as ordinary. If a less degree of diligence is exercised, the negligence is gross,
and for losses consequent he is liable.” (quoting Wallace v. Lincoln Sav. Bank, 15 S.W.
448, 453–54 (1890)).
27
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similar circumstances. . . .28’” In order to take advantage of the reliance
defense, a director must be diligent in his or her reliance on a report.29
CONCLUSION
The Delaware Supreme Court was presented with a board of
directors that was grossly negligent and did not act with even the minimal
amount of diligence that would have led them to realize that the report
they were relying on was uninformed. While the language in the court’s
holding might suggest that directors cannot rely on uninformed reports
even in the absence of red flags, the court’s reasoning shows that the
court’s intent was simply to further the rule that a report cannot be relied
upon when that reliance is not reasonably warranted. In Tennessee,
reliance on a report is not warranted when viewing the circumstances
surrounding the presentation of the report would lead a reasonable person
exercising ordinary diligence to conduct further inquiry into whether the
report was informed or uninformed.

Franklin Capital Assocs. v. Almost Family, Inc., 194 S.W.3d 392, 400 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2005) (quoting in part Hall v. Tenn. Dressed Beef Co., No. 701-A-01-9510-CH-00430,
1996 WL 355074, *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. November 25, 1996)). In the Hall decision, the
court quoted Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 48-18-301(a), -403(a) and cited Neese, 405 S.W.2d at
580 in formulating the language that the Franklin Capital Assocs. court quoted in its
formulation of what the duty of care requires.
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See generally Am. Network Grp. v. Kostyk, No. 01A01-9405-CH-00219, 1994 Ct. App.
LEXIS 619, at *21 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 1994) (“We see no reason why an executive
officer of a corporation should not be held responsible to the corporation resulting from
his lack of diligence.” “A corporate executive owes a duty to exercise not less than
ordinary diligence to the requirements of his position.”). Id.
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